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Exploring the Function of the Anti-communist Ideology  
in the Vietnamese American Diasporic Community 
 
Long Le 




The anti-communist ideology in the Vietnamese American community is 
increasingly perceived as a destabilizing force. Specifically, there is a shift from a 
number of younger Vietnamese American scholars in imposing a “critical 
perspective” on particular formulas and narratives, such as immigrant 
assimilation, American exceptionalism, “we-win-even-when-we-lose,” and 
“refugees as a showcase for democracy.” From this perspective, the anti-
communist ideology needs to be replaced by a new progressive ideology that can 
better promote the advancement of the Vietnamese people, here and elsewhere. In 
this article, the above call to cover the Vietnamese lives from more complex and 
critical perspectives is seen as an opportunity to revisit the function of the anti-
communist ideology, which is embedded in the Vietnamese American diasporic 
community.  
 
KEY WORDS: Vietnamese American anti-communist ideology, social capital, 
social movement, diaspora, critical perspective, and survey methodology. 
 
Introduction: Reviewing the Critical Perspective on the Anti-Communist Ideology 
   
According to a younger cohort of Vietnamese American scholars and activists, the anti-
communist ideology in the Vietnamese American community is increasingly becoming the 
Achilles’ heel to community development. The anti-communist ideology has created social 
divisions or “structural holes,” which makes it difficult for the community to organize for 
common goals. For this cohort of scholars and activists, there is a need to cover Vietnamese lives 
here and elsewhere from more complex and critical perspectives. Only by doing so, it becomes 
apparent that politics within the Vietnamese American diasporic community is still controlled by 
the first generation. As noted by scholar Linda Vo (2003), “homeland politics is still of primary 
importance and adopting fervent anti-communism ideologies is mandatory” but this does not 
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“necessarily represent the needs or voice of this extensive community” (p. xv-xvi). The problem 
is further exacerbated not only because the first generation of leaders garners the most media 
attention but also “a new generation of Vietnamese-American and other elected officials choose 
to fan the flame of hatred as the most convenient way to get votes” (Nguyen et al., 2004, para. 2).  
 Thus, a group of Vietnamese American studies scholars and activists has publicly spoken 
out against an extreme element in the Vietnamese American community, who had lobbied local 
officials in Garden Grove and Westminster—key cities of Little Saigon in southern California—
to pass resolutions in creating a “communist-free zone” to prevent “high-profile stopovers” by 
members and officials of the Vietnamese government. Importantly, these individuals argue that 
while anti-communist proponents are right to point out the lack of freedom of speech and human 
rights in Vietnam, the anti-communism ideology “is compelled very much by an obsession about 
a war that ended a long ago, and [which] blinds us to many other problems today” in the 
Vietnamese American community (Nguyen et al., 2004, para. 3). This staunchly anti-communist 
ideology is believed to have marginalized progressive identity-based projects and transnational 
activities, such as coalition building with other ethnic American groups in further advancing civil 
rights or a call for “confluence” in integrating the best of Vietnamese and overseas Vietnamese 
cultures as a basis for collaborations (Duong, 2009; A. Lam, 2008; T. Le, 2009; Ngo, 1996; 
Valverde, 2003). Because of such marginalization, there has been an inability to transcend the 
cold war identity politics among Vietnamese Americans as well as to reconcile relations between 
the Vietnamese diasporic community and Vietnam, respectively. For the younger Vietnamese 
American scholars and activists, perhaps it is Vietnamese Americans who want to bring 
democracy and freedom back to Vietnam that should first take “civic lessons” and learn to 
practice democratic principles in their diasporic community, since they appear to have given into 
their hatred against communism and thus may be ruled if they continue to insist on community 
censorship (Duong, 2009; A. Lam, 2008; T. Le, 2009; Reed, 2004).  
 In many ways, the above reflects a shift in the study of Vietnamese American experience, 
which is to challenge the accepted formulas (i.e., immigrant assimilation, ethnic enclaves, 
“American exceptionalism” for not having a socialist/Marxist identity, etc.) or narratives (i.e., 
the “refugees as a showcase for democracy,” the model minority, “we-win-even-when-we-lose,” 
etc.) for understanding Vietnamese American lives today (Aguilar-San Juan, 2009; Espiritu, 
2006; Thu-Huong, 2005; Vo, 2003). There is a younger cohort of Vietnamese American scholars 
who believe the trajectories of the Vietnamese American diasporic communities are changing—
new subgroups such as gay, adoptee, and racially mixed Vietnamese Americans are marking 
their own histories, while a growing 1.5 and second generation of Vietnamese Americans are 
finding their own voices beyond the “survival and silence” mode of their parents’ generation. 
And consequently the accepted formulas and narratives are no longer sufficient in covering or 
reflecting current transformations and dimensions within the community (Duong, 2005; Espiritu, 
2005; A. Lam, 2008; V. T. Nguyen, 2003; Thu-Huong, 2005; Vo, 2003).  
 Therefore, as advocated by Yen Le Espiritu (2005), there is a need to “impose a critical 
perspective” on particular stories, such as ones “that often remember South Vietnam as only free 
and democratic, North Vietnam as only ruthless and Communist, and the United States as only 
benevolent and powerful—and yet still bear witness to the ‘other truths’ behind these retellings” 
(p. xxi). And if a critical perspective were not imposed, according to Nguyen Vo Thu-Huong 
(2005), “the most simplistic anti-communist and pro-empire views” (p. 171) would dominate 
when Vietnamese Americans reprise their history in the U.S. Only by employing a critical lens, 
as noted by Viet Thanh Nguyen (2003), will it become clear that younger Vietnamese Americans 
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“often feel reluctant to voice contrary opinions” due to “political pressure and filial piety” 
(opinion section). As observed by Lan Duong (2005), this is why “mainstream” Vietnamese 
American filmmakers have tended to “distill the war and its after-effects through figuration, 
employing images that easily translate notions of misery, heritage, and history to a diasporic 
spectatorship” (pp. 2-3). It seems the fear that the Vietnamese diasporic community is not 
progressing toward being more tolerant of different political views—or not realizing that the 
anti-communist politics tends to privilege masculinity, heterosexuality, or the model of the 
“liberated and grateful refugees”—has led some of the noted critical scholars and activists to 
create or support new progressive identity-based projects.  
 One such project that aims to transcend the “survival and silence” mode and the anti-
communist ideology of the first generation is a Vietnamese American art exhibit called “F.O.B 
II: Art Speaks.” This exhibit features the communist flag as a statement to launch a discussion 
about freedom of expression. For example, one of the art works was an interactive voting booth 
that allows visitors to decide which flag represents them: the flag of the former Republic of 
South Vietnam, the official flag of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, or their own flag which 
they created using crayons. The exhibit also features a “Black Room,” which has highly sensitive 
political materials (i.e., a defamed flag of the former South Republic of Vietnam with three lines 
of barbed wires) but with the purpose that visitors should detach themselves from painful 
memories of which such symbols may evoke as “one way for us to heal and move forward as a 
community” (Vietnamese American Arts & Letters Association, 2009). The exhibit was open in 
the beginning of 2009 in Santa Ana, California but was forced to shut down earlier than 
scheduled due to community protest. The exhibit was organized by the Vietnamese American 
Arts & Letters Association, which stated that the exhibit was designed to launch a discussion 
about freedom of expression.  
 Some of the core members/supporters of the above organization comprise some of the 
earlier mentioned younger Vietnamese American scholars and activists, including Linda Vo, 
Viet Thanh Nguyen, Andrew Lam, Lan Duong and Nguyen Vo Thu-Huong. Although the 
exhibit’s organizers sought to be “sensitive enough for the community,” they also wanted “to 
confront the fear head on,” as they saw themselves as bridging the gap between the first and 
second generation of Vietnamese Americans (M. T. Tran, 2009). For both mainstream and the 
Vietnamese American media, the “F.O.B II” was to “test” whether the community is ready to 
respect the freedom for which it claimed to seek when they left Vietnam. The exhibit, at least as 
reported by the media, did not effectively bridge the generational politics or facilitate a dialogue 
on freedom of expression. However, for the organizers, the exhibit did facilitate a dialogue 
which “occurred in ways that are not easily recorded or do not make good news events” (L. N. 
Le, 2009, para. 23). Notwithstanding, such project seems either to underscore or parallel the 
effort by a younger cohort of Vietnamese American scholars and activists to challenge the 
“accepted” anti-communist ideology and to replace it with a new progressive ideology in order 
for new trajectories to root themselves within Vietnamese American diasporic community.  
 For this article, the noted shift in the study of the Vietnamese American experience and 
the emergence of a new progressive identity-based ideology provides the opportunity to review 
the growing literature on Vietnamese American anti-communism as well as to revisit the 
function of the anti-communist ideology. First, the younger cohort of Vietnamese American 
scholars and activists—most of whom are part of the so-called 1.5 generation of Vietnamese 
Americans born in Vietnam, whose family came in 1975, whose academic backgrounds are 
primarily in ethnic studies, and who are disproportionately women—tends to analyze and view 
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the anti-communist ideology as a cause of something (i.e., an independent variable). That is, 
through the critical perspective, the anti-communist ideology is seen only as a divisive factor to 
community building or an anti-thesis to the development of Vietnamese American studies; at 
least implicitly, there is not a need then to explain or justify the anti-communist ideology. For the 
noted cohort, the priority seems to be a call in developing new analytical formulas or new 
historical narratives to effectively cover the growing complexity and diversity of Vietnamese 
lives, here and elsewhere, so that research, teachings, and artistic and cultural perceptions of 
Vietnamese Americans are reflective of the community’s new trajectories in which social justice 
causes and multiracial alliance can take root (Vo, 2003). In addition, the rewriting, rereading, 
and retelling about the Vietnam War need to recover the “absences”—the women and the 
children and the men without ranks or guns from both South Vietnam and North Vietnam (Thu-
Huong, 2005). And perhaps by recommitting to democratic principles and civic engagement, the 
Vietnamese diasporic community can be an effective agent of change and find new ways to 
influence the future of Vietnam (A. Lam, 2008). No less important, by dismantling the accepted 
formulas and narratives, there are particular exposures that will become more visible. For 
example, according by Yen Le Espiritu (2006), only by rejecting the narrative of the “good” 
Vietnamese refugees who are successful, assimilated, and who are “rescued” from communist 
rule can one see “the superiority of a white American middle-class way of life” (p. 341) that is 
unlikely to be extended to Vietnamese Americans, whereas accepting the “righteousness of 
rescuing projects” by the U.S. would warrant a right to American hegemony to any part of the 
world deemed “enemies to freedom.” Or, as argued by Nguyen Vo Thu-Huong (2005), by 
freeing ourselves from the cold war rhetoric, ethical and political options will emerge, such as 
holding the current government of Vietnam “accountable for capitalistic exploitation of workers 
rather than communistic policies” (p. 171). 
 Clearly, in reviewing commentaries and essays by scholars and writers who have 
imposed a critical perspective on the Vietnamese American experience, many of the analyses are 
“underspecified.” That is, the anti-communist ideology as an independent variable or as a cause 
of something carries the connotation of only “divisiveness,” “intolerance,” or “unprogressive.” 
Or that it manifests only in political protests, demonstrations, boycotts, or “commercializing” for 
consumption. Interestingly, anti-communism is often not defined. Here, a definition by Thuy Vo 
Dang (2005) may become useful: Vietnamese American anti-communism is an opposition to the 
communist political ideology in general and to the current Vietnamese government specifically, 
while its affiliation is linked to U.S. democracy and capitalism. At least on the surface, this 
definition suggests, on the one hand, that divisiveness and intolerance can emerge when the anti-
communist ideology regulates or censors community members who question anti-communism or 
who affiliate with the communist regime’s projects; and even acts of violence can characterize 
such anti-communism. On the other hand, because Vietnamese American anti-communist 
ideology is linked to U.S. democracy and capitalism, such linkage can facilitate various aspects 
of adaptation, accommodation, incorporation, or assimilation.   
 For example, it was thought that the first wave of Vietnamese refugees had a distinct kind 
of “anticipatory socialization” to American society, giving them a distinct advantage over both 
earlier, pre-1965 Asian immigrants to the U.S. and other Southeast Asian refugees (Montero, 
1979). That is, given the “Vietnamization” of American influences in the former South 
Vietnam’s urban centers, Vietnamese refugees, particularly the household heads, had familiarity 
in dealing with Americans, the English language, American customs and popular culture. So 
compared to refugee populations that did not have such “anticipatory socialization,” the first 
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wave of Vietnamese refugees had far superior levels of English language skills and were able to 
develop English proficiency in a relatively short time (Kelly, 1986). More recently, research 
suggests that the success of Vietnamese American entrepreneurship relative to Vietnamese 
entrepreneurship in today’s Vietnam is due, in large part, to business environment. Both 
Vietnamese American and Vietnamese entrepreneurs share similar patterns regarding business 
decisions, but the latter is constrained and their entrepreneurial development is also distorted by 
poor business environment, including being crowded out by state-owned enterprises, lack of 
property rights and access to financing (Hung & Katsioloudes, 2005). With regard to political 
incorporation, Vietnamese Americans have utilized protests as the key available opportunity in 
American democracy to make claims, which focus primarily on homeland issues (Ong & Meyer, 
2004). The focus on homeland issues, according to recent empirical studies, is positively 
correlated with naturalization and voting among (as well as bloc-voting) for Vietnamese 
American candidates (Collet, 2005; Collet & Furuya, 2005; Lien, Conway, & Wong, 2004). 
Moreover, mobilization on homeland issues (i.e., gaining recognition of the flag from the former 
Republic of South Vietnam and advocating human rights for Vietnam) can complement 
subsequent political mobilization on domestic issues, such as hate crimes, affordable housing, 
bilingual education, rebuilding neighborhoods, and ethnic unity (Bui, Tang, & Kiang, 2004; Vu, 
2006; Wisckol, 2007). 
 In general, analyses that are underspecified are those that see the anti-communist 
ideology as having no positive attributes or don’t consider other factors when assessing the anti-
communist ideology as a cause of community disorganization. Also overlooked is that the 
practice of Vietnamese American anti-communism can inform the traditional formulas’ 
explanatory power. By implication, essays that do not include some aspects of benefit-and-cost 
analysis or consider different levels of analysis would seem to uncritically justify the conclusion 
that there is a need to go beyond the anti-communist ideology. For instance, while fervent 
Vietnamese American anti-communist sentiment makes it very difficult for community 
development, the before-mentioned critical perspectives often exclude other underlying divisive 
factors which may be strongly linked to the “structural holes” in the Vietnamese American 
community. In qualitative surveys, Vietnamese American community members have cited 
traditional behaviors, cultural and language divide between members of the community and 
public institutions, the lack of ESL classes for parents, and the need for after school programs for 
children losing their cultural heritage, as impediments and barriers of economic mobility and 
community cohesion (Peranteau et al., 2004).  
 Moreover, there are essays by up-and-coming Vietnamese American scholars that have 
analyzed the interaction between anti-communism and the immigration assimilation process and 
how each can shape the other. For C. N. Le (2009), the anti-communist political activism among 
Vietnamese Americans has not only allowed the community to emerge as an influential political 
constituency (both at local and national levels) but also as a source of ethnic solidarity which can 
resist against the inevitable tide of assimilation. However, C. N. Le (2009) notes that forces of 
assimilation are likely to moderate the fervent anti-communist sentiment (i.e., less violence and 
less confrontation), particularly among younger Vietnamese Americans. Yet, the anti-
communism as the foundation of ethnic solidarity within the Vietnamese American community 
will not necessarily be displaced. This is because anti-communism can be evolved into different 
forms, which is shaped, in part, by the degree of human rights abuses in Vietnam, and whether 
Vietnam’s economic development will be accompanied by appreciable increases in economic 
and political freedom. Similarly, Thuy Vo Dang (2005) observes that Vietnamese American anti-
5
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communism discourse over more than thirty years is “much more nuanced and complicated and 
has taken on many different cultural meanings” (p. 65). For sure, the first generation community 
leaders are not “ghosts of the past.” They are actively constructing a diasporic community in 
which anticommunism “becomes the vehicle for sustaining an identity and community in the 
present and serves as pedagogical tool” (p. 69) for the second generation, according to Thuy Vo 
Dang (2005) whose research focused on the Vietnamese community in San Diego, California. 
These scholars along with others (Bui et al., 2004; Ong & Meyers, 2004) have generally 
accounted for both negative and positive externalities from anti-communism. Such analyses tend 
to support the argument that anti-communism is still functional and its capacity to redefine may 
be taken for granted depending on who is organizing the anti-communism activities. The above 
perspective tends to come from Vietnamese American scholars who can be described as 
“community insiders.”  
 To be sure, there can be a critical perspective either by a “community outsider” or a non-
Vietnamese scholar that accounts for both positive and negative externalities of the Vietnamese 
American anti-communism. A recent book by academic Karin Aguilar-San Juan (2009), Little 
Saigons: Staying Vietnamese in America, is illustrative of this. Although Aguilar-San Juan 
admits that prior to her research on the community she wanted to “expose and dismantle the 
assumptions behind the narratives of immigrant assimilation and American exceptionalism,” (p. 
156) her utilization of the place-making concept allows her to see materials and discursive efforts 
by the community to stay Vietnamese in which assimilation narrative and anti-communism are 
essential components. That is, the “Little Saigons,” operating as a platform and an organizing 
device which hold (and perhaps increase) value, can shift and change so culture and identity can 
be recalibrated in order to find an “equilibrium state.” As a result, Vietnameseness is being 
redefined “to serve sometimes a myriad of simultaneous and sometimes contradictory social and 
historical functions” (p. xxvii). Importantly, such process will not be the same for all the “Little 
Saigons.” Yet, because Aguilar-San Juan believes that the ethnicity framework or the intragroup 
experience is limited, she pushes race as an analytical category for Vietnamese in which a larger 
panethnic construct of “Asian America” is an empowerment against racism. 
 Another critical analysis that is comprehensive and data driven is that of Roy Vu (2006). 
His doctoral thesis focuses on Houston’s Vietnamese community, whose Little Saigon is losing 
its distinctiveness because there are multiple Vietnamese business enclaves in Houston, although 
all enclaves are embedded with a “Southern Vietnamese Nationalism” which, in part, has been 
revived by anti-communist politics (Vu, 2006). Vu’s study is driven by a critical thesis 
attempting to disprove myths of Vietnamese Americans as an Asian “model minority” group 
(i.e., economically successful but apolitical). On the one hand, he finds that anti-communist 
politics had earlier bonded a bifurcated community, which over the years has been amended to 
develop a domestic agenda addressing socio-economic problems. On the other hand, Vu argues 
that staunch anti-communism (i.e., political red-baiting or a “Red Scare” environment) in the 
near future will hinder the maturation of the community’s development which does not correlate 
with American mainstream politics. Therefore, Vu (2006) advises Vietnamese Americans to 
realize that “a different historical trajectory exists,” organizing through “the history of 
noncommunist democracy” rather than the staunch anti-communism “to preserve the Southern 
Vietnamese national identity” (p. 407). This is because such ethnic identity is inevitable in that it 
“provides a safety net, a coping mechanism, and a strategy in settling a new country” (p. 403).  
 Overall, the noted critical perspectives on Vietnamese American anticommunism raise 
important questions: Is there a need to explain the anti-communist ideology? And is there a need 
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to transcend the anti-communist ideology? For critical scholars such as Yen Le Espiritu, Nguyen 
Vo Thu-Huong, Linda Vo, Viet Thanh Nguyen, and Lan Duong, the answers are “no” and “yes,” 
respectively. Meanwhile, other critical scholars such as Karin Aguilar-San Juan and Roy Vu, the 
answer are “yes” and “no.” Though both Aguilar-San Juan and Vu call for further shifting and 
redefining so “Vietnameseness” could include pan-Asian Americanism and American 
progressivism, such calls are effectively insertions of the authors’ agendas without accounting 
their subjects’ voices on Asian American panethnicity and political progressivism. For example, 
Aguilar-San Juan’s (2009) call is based on her view of a “hegemonic racial order,” which will 
prevent most Vietnamese, no matter how suburbanized or successful, from fully exercising the 
privileges of “whiteness.” Vu’s (2006) call is based on his view that there is a legacy of 
participatory democracy within the “Southern Vietnamese Nationalism”—promoted during the 
Vietnam War by overseas students who joined anti-war rallies in the U.S., Southern Vietnamese 
communists and non-communist reformers in Vietnam—that should be revived within the 
Vietnamese American community today. 
 Although this article will address the above questions posed by the critical perspectives, 
its primary purpose is to introduce, explore, and generate interest so as to facilitate a potential 
study of theory and research on Vietnamese American anti-communism. In such spirit, the article 
proposes a framework that would allow the anti-communist ideology to be analyzed as both an 
independent variable and dependent variable. Specifically, the concept of social capital is utilized 
to assess the positive and negative externalities of the anti-communist ideology as a cause of 
something, while the concept of a social movement is used to understand the anti-communist 
ideology as an outcome of the Vietnam War. In accounting for the subjects’ voices, the article 
will utilize research-based surveys—including the author’s own exploratory and nonrandom 
surveys—but with emphasis on the limits of substantive interpretations from survey 
methodology. The article’s contribution is mainly to facilitate and to recognize the growing 
literature on Vietnamese American anti-communism, as well as encouraging and developing 
more research-based surveys to better examine the anti-communist ideology at different levels of 
analysis. 
 
Viewing the Anti-Communist Ideology through Social Capital 
 
In attempting to further conceptualize the anti-communist ideology, the concept of a Vietnamese 
American diasporic community is utilized, of which can be equipped with explanatory power. 
For instance, the diaspora component can be classified in ways that could provide new insights. 
Here, the Vietnamese American diaspora can be categorized as either “stateless” or “state-
linked” to the current Vietnamese government (Sheffer, 2003), and the development within the 
Vietnamese American diaspora can be characterized as “mobilized” or “proletarian” (Armstrong, 
1976). Meanwhile, the community component can be defined in terms of prevailing attitudes, so 
as to ascertain whether the community can offer the benefits and resources to those who seek it. 
Here, it can be determined whether the Vietnamese American community has two essential 
features: solidarity (i.e., sentiments that draw people together) and significance (i.e., a sense of 
achievement and fulfillment) (Clark, 1973). By many accounts, the Vietnamese American 
diaspora can be classified as “stateless” and does not link its lived experience—its history, 
heritage symbols, and political identity—to the current development policies of the government 
of Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Vietnamese American diaspora can also be described as 
“mobilized,” in which the Vietnamese foreign born entering the U.S. in the 1980s, 1990s, and 
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2000-2005 have seen an increase in terms of English proficiency, proportion of college 
graduates, the number of owner-occupied housing, family median income, naturalization, and 
voting, while public assistance and the poverty rate have decreased over the same period. Lastly, 
through the “Little Saigon” the Vietnamese American community has been observed as being 
able to put back the “place” in displacement, which expresses needs and desires that were quite 
different from U.S. resettlement policy, that is, U.S. policymakers had wanted Vietnamese 
refugees to only take on an American identity, and they discouraged Vietnamese from forming 
their own ethnic communities.  
 The above typologies are not used to support or reject the immigrant assimilation formula 
or “we-win-even-when-we-lose” narrative. Rather, they are used to frame how the anti-
communist ideology emerges from the Vietnamese American experience, embeds in the 
community’s place-making, and is shaped by internal and external factors. Moreover, these 
typologies can also be used to frame the overseas Vietnamese experiences in Southeast Asia/East 
Asia and Western Europe/Eastern Europe (H. Le, 2006; Wah, 2005). Indeed, the article proposes 
that in such framing the anti-communist ideology can be better contextualized both as an 
independent variable (i.e., as a cause of something) and a dependent variable (i.e., as an outcome 
of particular socio-political factors or conditions). In this section, the focus is on the anti-
communist ideology as an independent variable, which not only can facilitate the development 
within the Vietnamese American diaspora but also can give rise to the essential features of the 
Vietnamese American community. In the previous section, the literature review shows that the 
anti-communist ideology can have positive attributes, such as: (a) helping to resist some aspects 
of assimilation in order to stay Vietnamese (Aguilar-San Juan, 2009; Dang, 2005; C. N. Le, 
2009); (b) creating a bonded solidarity among diverse sub-groups, at least early on in the 
resettlement (Dang, 2005; C. N. Le, 2009; Vu, 2006); (c) sustaining an identity and community 
in the present and future (Dang, 2005; C. N. Le, 2009); and (d) facilitating political incorporation 
(Bui et al., 2004; Ong & Meyers, 2004). Some of the concepts utilized in the above works, such 
as the place-making of the “Little Saigons” and anti-communism as the foundation of ethnic 
solidarity, are indeed equipped with explanatory power but have not directly or empirically used 
to examine the function of the anti-communist ideology. 
 Here, in exploring how to measure both negative and positive externalities of the anti-
communist ideology as a cause of something to the Vietnamese American diasporic community, 
social capital is employed. For our purposes, social capital is defined as a quality created 
between people in which social relationship provides the opportunity for individuals to claim 
access to sources possessed by associates (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992). Of course, in some 
social structures, social capital is created more efficiently and effectively and, thus, the amount 
and quality of social capital are given attention (Coleman, 1990). According to Alejandro Portes 
(1998), to possess social capital a person must be related to others, and that there must be a 
motivation of those others to make sources available. Fortunately, the sources of social capital 
are plural. This includes identification with one’s group or group solidarity, which can be a 
powerful motivational force in making resources available to members of the group and 
providing an effective antidote to free-riding by others in collective projects (Coleman, 1990). 
Another source of benefits is through extra-familial networks that have been invoked as an 
explanation of access to employment and entrepreneurial success (Loury, 1977). However, the 
same mechanisms appropriable by individuals and groups can have other negative consequences, 
including exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members, and restrictions on individual 
freedom (Portes, 1998). 
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 So how does social capital relate to the Vietnamese American diasporic community? At 
least in the early stages of resettlement both in the U.S. after 1975 and in the refugee camps in 
the Southeast Asian countries after 1978, Vietnamese refugees had sought for the presence of a 
Vietnamese community in order to cope with being physically, psychologically, culturally, 
economically, and intellectually displaced (Kelly, 1977; Reyes, 1999). For example, Adelaida 
Reyes’s (1999) ethnographic study of a Vietnamese refugee camp in Palawan (an island province 
of the Philippines) found that the forming of a council community provided Vietnamese “the 
significance of a sense of community” and “the solidarity of its Vietnamese members,” both of 
which “are hard to overestimate” because they “were essential if the asylees were to recover their 
equilibrium” (p. 31). At the same time, the council community’s programs underscored not only 
the need for refugees to prepare for a western culture but also the need to “conserve a 
Vietnamese way of life that Communism has destroyed,” (p. 30) including the weekly flag 
ceremony, the singing of the old national anthem, and the importance to uphold democratic 
values such as the elections of council members by camp residents (Reyes, 1999). And once in 
the U.S., Vietnamese refugees sought and relied on community support. According to a 
comprehensive survey conducted in major U.S. cities that hosted Vietnamese refugees, about 90 
percent of Vietnamese respondents believe that Vietnamese should stick together in order to 
keep company with each other for mutual assistance, and about 73 percent disagreed with the 
statement that when in need of financial aid it is best to rely mainly on relatives (Starr & Roberts, 
1982). However, expectations to the benefits of ethnic solidarity and community networks 
require individuals to be “upstanding” members, meaning not having any suspicion of 
communist affiliation (Hein, 1995; Reyes, 1999). 
 From the above, perhaps we can generalize that one of the sources giving rise to the 
Vietnamese American community’s sense of significant and solidarity is the common experience 
of being “pushed out” by communist rule. In addition, we can generalize that the Vietnamese 
American community as a “stateless” diaspora is the result of community members’ beliefs that 
communism was to blame for their displacement as well as for the lack of human rights and 
freedom in Vietnam that “forced” them to emigrate. Therefore, overall, one type of social capital 
that has characterized the social relationships and social structures of the Vietnamese American 
community is that of a bounded solidarity which may make Vietnamese refugees more tightly 
and cohesively organized than they were before emigration as well as at a particular period 
during the resettlement in the host society or which may enable the Vietnamese American 
community to organize more easily and effectively, at least on homeland issues, whereas other 
communities seem unable to organize resources. Moreover, the “zeal” from group solidarity may 
further grease the source for mutual assistance, information channels, patchworking and credit 
associations, and fundraising within the Vietnamese American community. To be sure, some 
forms of social capital has been observed and measured both within the Vietnamese American 
family and the Vietnamese American community (Collet, 2005; Gold, 1992; Haines, Rutherford, 
& Thomas, 1981; Hein, 1995; Kibria, 1994; Ong & Meyers, 2004; Starr & Roberts, 1982; Zhou 
& Bankston, 1998). However, social capital has not been used to examine the anti-communist 
ideology or examine how the anti-communist ideology can facilitate social capital.  
 To empirically test some of the above hypotheses, one could use past surveys to identify 
observable variables that can be used as proxies for both the anti-communist ideology and social 
capital. For example, one could test whether individuals who report that they had left Vietnam 
for “political reasons” or “for democracy” would also report that Vietnamese Americans should 
work together for mutual assistance, or have been involved in rotating credit associations and 
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patchworking. Here, a database that I have used in past research can offer some insights and may 
facilitate further research questions (L. Le, 2002). The Houston Area Asian Survey (HAAS), 
conducted in 1995 by the Department of Sociology at Rice University led by Stephen Klineberg, 
has information on reasons why individuals left for the United States. The survey identified 609 
Asian households from a list of 36,300 randomly generated four-digit numbers attached to the 
prefixes serving Harris County Texas telephones. A total of 500 selected Asian respondents 
completed the lengthy interviews—a response rate of more than 82 percent. The valid margin of 
error is plus or minus 4 percent. The HAAS consists of 151 Vietnamese respondents, 127 
Chinese respondents, 112 Indian and Pakistan respondents, 59 Filipino respondents, 28 South 
Korean respondents, and 23 others. Regarding the reasons for emigration, Vietnamese 
respondents stood out in which the overwhelming majority reported to have left Vietnam for 
politics/war/democracy. Among non-Vietnamese Asian respondents, the overwhelming majority 
reported to have left either for economics/work/education or visiting relatives/marriages. As 
such, the HAAS allows me to utilize Vietnamese who left Vietnam for politics/war/democracy as 
a proxy for the anti-communist ideology, while I use participation in Asian meetings and Asian 
festivals as a proxy for social capital. And because the HAAS is comprehensive, this provides 
me the opportunity to test some of the above assumptions.  
  Table 1 has two indices that I created that measure for “liberal” tradition beliefs and 
“Asian” cultural beliefs in which each tradition is thought to be important in terms of having the 
“right” values that correlate with upward mobility. I then examine how Vietnamese who left 
Vietnam for politics/war/democracy would score on both these indices in comparison to non-
Vietnamese Asians who left either for economics/work/education or visiting relatives/marriages. 
Table 1 shows that Vietnamese who left Vietnam for politics/war/democracy has the highest 
index score, based on the aggregate means of the rating scale, on both the “Asian Cultural 
Beliefs Index” and the “Liberal Tradition Beliefs Index.” If having the “right” values are 
conducive to upward mobility, Vietnamese who left for politics/war/democracy is tentatively 
correlated with both “Asian” and “Western” values. Prior ethnographic studies also found that 
Vietnamese refugees’ cultural ideals were able to co-exist with views that the American way of 
life was progressive, modern, and scientific (Freeman, 1989; Gold, 1992; Rutledge, 1992).  
 
Table 1 
Proxy Variables for Anti-communist and Liberal/“Asian” Beliefs 
 
PROXY VARIABLES Asian Cultural Beliefs Index1 Liberal Tradition Beliefs Index2 
Left for Politics/War/Democracy   2.76    3.46 
 
Left for Economic/Work/Education  2.39    3.45 
 
Left for Relatives/Marriages   2.73    3.34 
 
Note. For more information on the Houston Area Asian Survey, visit http://www.houstonareasurvey.org/, then click 
on 2005 Report. 
                                                
1 Agree wishes of family priority over personal wishes; agree that woman with young shouldn’t work; very often 
teach younger family member about background; religion is very important; and very often participate in Asian 
holiday or cultural events 
2 Agree if work hard one will succeed; agree few jobs without college; yes voted in the last federal election; 
definitely will become citizens; and agree everyone who wants to work can find a job 
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In Table 2, I attempt to examine whether Vietnamese who left Vietnam for 
politics/war/democracy are likely to participate in Asian meetings and Asian festivals. Table 2 
shows that Vietnamese who left Vietnam for politics/war/democracy had the highest percentage 
score in both measurements in comparison to Vietnamese who either left for 
economics/work/education or visiting relatives/marriages. Prior ethnographic studies also found 
that Vietnamese refugees with limited resources were able to organize themselves more tightly 
and cohesively by the three networks of family, community, and politics (Caplan, Whitmore, & 
Choy, 1989; Hein, 1995; Kibria, 1993; Rutledge, 1985; Starr & Roberts, 1982). 
 
Table 2 
Proxy Variables for Anti-communist and Social Capital 
 
PROXY VARIABLES % Participated in Asian Meetings % Participated in Asian  
 of Asian Organizations and Festivals Holidays 
Left Vietnam for Politics/ 55 86 
War/ Democracy 
 
Left Vietnam for Economic/ 51 85 
Work/Education 
 
Left Vietnam for Relatives 31 70 
Marriages 
 
Note. For more information on the Houston Area Asian Survey, visit http://www.houstonareasurvey.org/, then click 
on 2005 Report. 
 
 A substantive interpretation from the above descriptive results would be that if leaving 
Vietnam for politics/war/democracy is a “good” proxy for the anti-communist ideology, then the 
anti-communist ideology may not be an impediment in terms of contradicting values that are 
thought to be correlated with upward mobility. In my doctoral thesis (L. Le, 2002), I demonstrate 
through logistic regression with control for other variables that leaving for 
politics/war/democracy had no negative effect on predicting employment and annual income. 
However, it did have negative effect on predicting education and language levels. Not unlike 
previous studies, my regression models find that leaving for politics/war/democracy was 
positively correlated with naturalization and voting. Another substantive interpretation would be 
that that if participation in Asian meetings and Asian festivals are a “good” proxy for social 
capital, then the anti-communist ideology may not be an impediment to some forms of social 
capital to emerge. While more rigorous examination is required, the above descriptive results do 
not necessarily rule out the hypothesis that the anti-communist ideology can have some positive 
attributes, specifically the ability to generate social capital. If there is an agreement that social 
relations and social structures within the Vietnamese American community facilitate some forms 
of social capital, then it is necessary to further explore the relations between anti-communist 
ideology and social capital, both theoretically and empirically. In part, this is because 
Vietnamese American anti-communism has been invoked to shape and affect particular 
outcomes. It should be noted that descriptive results from the HAAS are in no way presented as 
definite answers on the strength of the correlation or the causality between the anti-communist 
ideology and social capital. However, the discussion of the results is intended to inform future 
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empirical research so that it can be more effective and efficient in answering how social capital 
can be shaped by the anti-communist ideology or how the anti-communist ideology motivates 
actors to create resources and networks for others and what the effects of the created sources and 
networks are. 
 Not to be overlooked is that utilizing social capital would also lead us to examine its 
negative effect. That is, the same mechanisms underlying social capital, such as “closure of 
social networks,” can have other less desirable consequences. Here, one of the functions of social 
capital, social control, can provide analytical insights on how the anti-communist ideology can 
be a divisive factor. That tight social control as result of fervent anti-communism can restrict 
personal freedom, exclude or silence individuals who do not adhere to certain pillars of the 
community. For example, according to journalistic accounts, there have been five suspected 
assassinations of Vietnamese American journalists from 1981 to 1990 who had questioned the 
financial spending and political tactics of a leading anti-communist political group in the early 
1980s, the United Front for the Liberation of Vietnam (Carney 1993; Kolker 1995; Zuniga 
1994). Of the five suspected assassinations, one was in Houston (TX), two in California, and two 
in Fairfax (VA). According to Roy Vu (2001), “the greatest tragedy was that not only did the 
murder cases remain unsolved” but “in the long run, the idiocy behind the fervent anti-
communist sentiment has blinded the Vietnamese American community and derailed any real 
democratic course of actions” (p. 131). Tight social control can also restrict the benefits from 
extra-familial networks to be extended to Vietnam’s development or restrict the trustworthiness 
of social relations and social structures in reconciling the political divide between the 
Vietnamese American community and the current Vietnamese regime. For example, in reaction 
to the political leaders of the “Little Saigons” who came out against the abolishment of U.S. 
trade embargo on Vietnam in 1994, academic Thanh Nhan Ngo (1996) argued that “the anti-
communist ideology, which reigned supreme over the community for years, is the cause of such 
division, i.e. it is forced, it is repressive and it is unpopular” (para. 16). Similarly, in attempting 
to facilitate more investment to Vietnam after the bilateral trade agreement between the U.S. and 
Vietnam in 2001, former South Vietnam’s Prime Minister Cao Ky Nguyen (2006) pleads that “it 
is time for the so-called anti-communist Vietnamese, the older generation now living most in 
exile, to let go of their pain and anger and allow the younger generation, our sons and daughters, 
to have their chances to bring Vietnam together” (p. 366). 
 The above does seem to suggest that the anti-communist ideology has caused some 
“structural holes” or internal divisions within the Vietnamese American community. However, at 
the same time, it is not clear how deep and wide those “structural holes” are and whether the 
anti-communist ideology is inherently unprogressive, such as leading to intolerance of attitude 
toward other dislikes, privileging masculinity and heterosexuality, or impeding coalition building 
with other minority groups. Again, referencing back to social capital can be advantageous in 
terms of examining whether the network of ties within the Vietnamese American community is 
capable of acting in concert. That is, if a community has been portioned into clique organizations 
or its social structures have been fragmented, there is a need for actors or leaders to have “weak 
ties” in order to bridge the divides; the more “local bridges,” the more cohesive the community 
(Granovetter, 1973). Thus, it is important to analyze individuals/groups that are organizing or 
transcending the anti-communist ideology, as well as understanding the context that those 
individuals/groups are acting under and for what purpose. Perhaps doing so, the projects of such 
individuals/groups can be better understood regarding how or who they include or exclude and 
whether they produce some form of optimal outcomes or create greater division. 
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The “Equilibrium State” of the Anti-Communist Ideology 
 
Because the focus is on the function of the anti-communist ideology, a key question is whether 
the Vietnamese American anti-communism can be redefined so as to be still capable of not only 
drawing people together based on sympathy and trust but also creating a sense of achievement 
and redemption. There are observations that the anti-communist ideology is not diminishing. 
This could be seen in the campaigns to urge state governments and municipalities to pass 
resolution in making the flag of the former South Vietnam the “Heritage Freedom Flag of 
Vietnamese Americans.” Since February 2003, there have been more than 85 resolutions that 
have been passed, including fifteen states (L. Le, 2010). In this section, the focus is on the anti-
communist ideology as a dependent variable or as an outcome of particular socio-political factors 
or conditions.  
 Framed in this way, the “origin” of anti-communist ideology can be traced back to earlier 
reform movements of the late 1890s in Vietnam led by Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chau Trinh. 
Both men were well-known non-communist nationalists who believed that Vietnam had the 
rights to learn from the West and from the East in order to modernize and revitalize Vietnamese 
culture and institutions. And both separated themselves from their communist patriots who 
refused to acknowledge that French colonial rule had had or could have provided positive 
contributions and who would revile anyone who associated with western colonialism (T. B. Lam, 
2003). This would explain, in part, why the Vietnamese American diaspora has “memorialized” 
these two figures and not communist figures from the nationalist movements during French 
colonization. When the 1954 Geneva Accord divided the country into two halves, initially some 
million in-country refugees fled to the “non-communist” south and, thus, an official “non-
communist” heritage was inaugurated with the establishment of the Republic of South Vietnam. 
According to Louis Wiesner (1988), the southern migration in 1954 was driven by “ideological 
reasons or because they could no longer stand the exactions in men and material support of the 
Communists” (p. 224). With the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, the anti-communist ideology had 
emerged, which was associated with the mass refugee exodus to western countries. That is, 
through the wealth of personal experiences communism has been blamed “for painful separation 
from families, the loss of property and prestige, the risks that they had to take to escape, the loss 
of life at sea, the pirate attacks, and the rape of women” (Reyes, 1999, p. 116). Now in the post-
cold war era, the anti-communist ideology appears to be undergoing some strategic shifting and 
changing. For example, a survey conducted in 2000 showed that a growing number of 
Vietnamese Americans traveled to Vietnam, and that 60 percent of Vietnamese Americans said 
they would return to live in Vietnam if the country was free and democratic (Brody, Rimmer, & 
Trotter, 2000). On the one hand, such refinement is necessary to serve purposeful functions—
socially, historically, and politically—but it has always been imperfect and fragile due to the 
very conditions that made the refinement necessary on the other.  
 Here, the concept of a social movement is introduced in order to better contextualize the 
anti-communist ideology as a dependent variable. That is, framing the Vietnamese American 
diaspora as a social movement, its engagement in a political conflict or struggle across space and 
time can be examined. As noted by Adelaida Reyes (1999), Vietnamese refugee movements are 
triggered by cataclysmic events that result in an eruption of emotional behavior, rupture with 
homeland’s government, loyalty to the status quo ante home, and a professed longing to return 
home. Analytically, the Vietnamese American diaspora as a social movement brings into focus 
the ideology of its activists in which there is a self-identity, a consciousness of the movement’s 
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opponent, and a theory of totality (Touraine, 1981). Of the three components, self-identity is of 
particular interest. That self-identity can offer analytical points of view, including the fact that 
individuals are in a social movement when they see themselves as a part of one (Eagleton, 1990). 
Moreover, when self-identity is viewed across time, the unit of analysis becomes a practice or a 
pattern of activities carried out by individuals (Kashima, Foddy, & Platow, 2002). From this 
view, identity can be shaped by a process of “meaning making” of symbolical activities by 
specific individuals acting in context. By implication, the question becomes whether there is a 
“meaning making” process among the anti-communist ideology’s activists or by individuals who 
see themselves as part of an anti-communist ideology’s movement. If so, what are the practices 
and patterns of the anti-communist identity and what aspects of those activities are being 
reproduced and have been persistent? And how do such activities affect the opponent and theory 
of totality of the anti-communist ideology’s movement?  
 According to the before mentioned scholars associated with the critical perspective, the 
anti-communist identity rising from the Cold War era does little in facilitating the representation 
of the diverse interests of the Vietnamese American community today or having anything to say 
about contemporary Vietnam beyond blaming communism. For example, Andre Lam (2008) 
argues that a Vietnamese living abroad “will be sidelined if he fails to go beyond flying the flags 
of South Vietnam in shopping malls, erecting war memorials for fallen soldiers, organizing anti-
communist protests and, lately, renaming business districts,’’ which “have no apparent effect on 
Vietnam itself’’ (para. 10). From the above perspective, Vietnamese American anti-communism 
as a discourse or as a movement is outdated and increasingly becoming irrelevant to today’s 
realities. To be sure, in the early 1980s some American scholars had also thought the Vietnamese 
refugee collective identity would be of limited help, and would be instead, “by definition, now 
part of another people’s national consensus” (i.e., Vietnamese are now a part of the American 
national consensus whose mobility is linked to “Americanization”) (Haines et al., 1981, p. 311). 
Others reasoned that complete assimilation was desirable for Vietnamese refugees to better meet 
their needs and, due to government dispersal policy, predicted that the embrace of Vietnamese 
enclaves “will probably be short-lived compared to other Asian immigrants [pre-1965]” 
(Montero, 1979, p. 644). In the post-cold war politics, scholars such as Douglas Pike suggest that 
anti-communism will erode with time when “the older [Vietnamese] people die off and younger 
[Vietnamese] people don’t buy into it. Like any bad memory, it will fade within each generation” 
(T. Tran, 2000, para. 21).  
 The key difference between American scholars and Vietnamese American scholars 
associated with the critical perspective is that the latter calls for Vietnamese Americans to 
assimilate to a progressive Asian American movement’s identity; that is, taking part in Asian 
American panethnicity and political progressivism would minimize the effects of the anti-
communism discourse, which usually drown out domestic concerns in the community and 
impede reconciliation projects with Vietnam. In part, because scholars view anti-communism as 
a divisive factor within a period of time or within the construction of symbolic meaning, their 
unit of analysis is of individuals who are persistent about their identity but who should let go of 
that identity. From this view, time may not be on the side of the anti-communism because, in 
part, younger generations will come to terms with the Vietnam War and its aftermath in their 
own ways, extending themselves beyond the cold-war politics of their parents’ generation (Vo, 
2003). In general, the above view emphasizes that particular Vietnamese American subgroups 
are unable to let go of the past and would highlight recent Vietnamese American protests as 
evidence. For example, a protest in San Jose was organized in 2007 against a Vietnamese 
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American elected official who was perceived to have gone against the wishes of the community 
to name a Vietnamese American business area as “Vietnam Business District” instead of “Little 
Saigon District.”  
 However, when Vietnamese American anti-communism is viewed across contexts or 
across time, it takes on a different quality. This has been noted by recent scholarships, including 
those whose research is based on a critical perspective. For instance, Karin Aguilar-San Juan 
(2009) argues that staying Vietnamese, which is embedded in anti-communism, is a “thoughtful 
and deliberate recalibration of culture and identity” (p. xxvii). As such, Vietnamese Americans 
can find a new “equilibrium state” that could serve a myriad of simultaneous and sometimes 
contradictory social and historical functions (Aguilar-San Juan, 2009). Similarly, seeing 
Vietnamese American anti-communism as a discourse, individuals within Vietnamese America 
can be understood as constructing “community and identity in everyday practices and through 
not only political but cultural and personal spaces,” according to Thuy Vo Dang (2005, p. 68). 
Therefore, Vietnamese America “is not forever bounded to an immutable past” but can actively 
deploy “anti-communism as a signifier for ‘freedom and heritage’ and as a pedagogical tool for 
the second generation” (Dang, 2005, p. 83). From this view, leaders or activists can produce and 
reproduce the underlying identity of anti-communism. The question then becomes what aspects 
of their situated activities have been reproduced and which have been persistent.  
 Casual observations suggest that what appears to be persistence is the belief that Vietnam 
should be a non-communist, democratic nation and that the heritage of the former Republic of 
South Vietnam must be commemorated and honored, at least symbolically. Meanwhile, what is 
subject to change is how to make Vietnam into a “free and democratic” nation. This would better 
explain that activities relating to Vietnam now include travel, work, volunteering, social 
connections, and retirement. In particular, “fighting communism” is no longer pursued by 
military means but by peaceful means, such as utilizing the political process and lobbying for 
human rights and democracy in Vietnam. It is thought that sociopolitical factors or the 
international conditions have “enticed” the anti-communist ideology’s activists to redefine anti-
communism. That is, military means to advance anti-communism—in light of normalization 
between U.S. and Vietnam and in the post 9/11 environment—is not politically or legally viable. 
In fact, in recent years, anti-communist projects have focused on “the future of the people [of 
Vietnam] not of a contemporary political regime” in which social justice is promoted and 
information through the diasporic media is designed to encourage ordinary Vietnamese to be 
active rather than maintain a passive stance or the “wait-and-see” attitude (Q. M. Le, 2006, para. 
13). Moreover, there are discussions about the need of bridging the past and future and between 
the overseas Vietnamese community and Vietnam, particularly the “differences of views and 
opinions between young and old need to be addressed” but the objectives must consider 
“national sovereignty, multi-party politics, respect for human rights and social justice” (T. L. 
Lam, 2000, para. 7).  
 It is also probable that in the near future building relations with private entities—
including academic, cultural, and economic—will be accepted but only if such entities are more 
or less “independent” from the state. There are now a number of Vietnamese Americans who are 
on the front line of this movement. For example, scholar and community activist Xuan Khoa Le 
(2005) notes that overseas Vietnamese “haven’t really been calm and objective enough . . . in 
reviewing the past to learn new lessons,” (para. 16) while the communist government “has 
changed its attitude toward Vietnamese refugees, from denouncing them as ‘traitors’ to ‘an 
important resource’ for the development of the country” (Do, 2005, para. 21). However, Xuan 
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Khoa Le also recognizes that the communist regime has yet to admit its past mistakes and has 
not allowed an environment conducive to reconciliation. That government’s policy toward the 
overseas communities remains simply a strategy “designed by the winners trying to convert the 
losers to their side” (para. 21). In turn, contributions by the Vietnamese American diaspora are 
“directed only toward in improving the lives of people in the country and facilitating the process 
of change, not to support the government or regime” (Do, 2005, para 22).  
  To be sure, the Vietnamese American diaspora is made up of different migration 
vintages whose ethnicity is always in a state of flux. This further contributes to the 
“heterogeneity, hybridity, and multiplicity” in which the anti-communism may not be able to 
maintain an “equilibrium state.” A particular challenge has been that of generational division. 
One study, focusing on the generation gap in the Vietnamese American community in San 
Francisco Bay Area, found young Vietnamese American adults to be lukewarm to the affairs of 
Vietnam and do not put a high priority on human rights issues there, compared to the older 
members who are more attentive and passionate about both issues (Collet & Selden, 2003). Some 
young adults are afraid to be a leader in community activities because they can be accused of 
being a “communist sympathizer” if they don’t confirm to the anti-communist politics. The 
concern then is whether the gap between generations will grow in the near future or whether the 
indifference or fear of young Vietnamese Americans will continue to be drowned out by older 
members who are more intensive and conservative about homeland politics. Thus, a key question 
might be whether the change and persistence that are parcel to the anti-communism can be 
organized for other purposes or reproduced to bridge divisions.  
Here, I have conducted two exploratory, nonrandom surveys that could provide insights. 
Both surveys were conducted through the Politics Research Center at California State University 
at Bakersfield, and their discussions are meant to facilitate further research. These exploratory 
surveys target young Vietnamese Americans who I describe as “consumers” of the Vietnamese 
American community’s social and political activities. That is, one group that might play a role in 
producing and reproducing anti-communism is younger Vietnamese Americans who either see 
themselves or will see themselves as a part of the anti-communist ideology’s movement. I 
assume that such individuals are likely to be “consumers” of activities organized by anti-
communist projects. Young Vietnamese Americans who would fall under such categorization are 
those who would attend or participate in political protests or be involved in organizations that 
associate themselves with leaders and activists of the Vietnamese American community. By 
implication, it would not be surprising then that some of the future leaders and activists of the 
anti-communist ideology’s movement would come from such individuals or organizations.  
 The first is an e-survey of Vietnamese Student Associations (VSAs) from 15 universities: 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Harvard University, California State University at 
Long Beach, North Carolina State University, University of Buffalo, University of Oklahoma, 
Wichita State University, University of Maryland at College Park, Kansas State University, 
University of California at Santa Barbara, Washington State University, Indiana University, 
University of South Florida, University of California at Los Angeles, and University of 
Washington. This e-survey was nonrandom and was conducted in spring of 2004. Its sample size 
was 102 and all respondents are members of VSAs from the noted universities. According to the 
e-survey literature, one of the key challenges is the response rate in which the “best” is about 40 
percent. The response rate of the e-survey was 31 percent, short of the ideal but considered to be 
above the “typical.” The second survey was conducted at the Vietnam Freedom March in 
Washington, D.C. on April 30, marking the 30th anniversary of the fall of South Vietnam. Its 
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sample size was 94, and about 94 percent of the respondents were under the age of 34. About a 
third of the respondents were born in the U.S., while almost two-thirds came to the U.S. 
sometime between 1979 to1999. Respondents’ state residency spanned 10 states.  
 
Table 3  
Survey of Young Vietnamese Americans on Protest Politics 
 
 
1. Would you say that most Vietnamese in America can be trusted or that you need to be 
careful in dealing with Vietnamese? 
Most Vietnamese can be trusted: 42%  
Some Vietnamese can be trusted: 58%          
Most Vietnamese cannot be trusted: 0% 
 
2. Would you agree or disagree that Vietnamese in America should work together for mutual 
assistance? 
Agree: 100 % 
Disagree: 0 % 
 
3. Please indicate how you personally would define the word “anti-communist” to mean today? 
Fighting communism: 19%        
Fighting for democracy and pluralism: 38%  
Encouraging Vietnam to improve its policy on human rights, democratic norms and practices: 38%  
Other: 3% 
 
4. Please indicate how you think Vietnamese leaders in America today would define the word 
“anti-communist”? 
Fighting communism: 47%   
Fighting for democracy and pluralism: 29%  
Encouraging Vietnam to improve its policy on human rights, democratic norms and practices: 18%  
Other: 3% 
 
5. Generally speaking would you say that mobilization on homeland issues provides a 
foundation for subsequent political mobilization on domestic issues or whether it serves as a 
distraction from it? 
Provides mobilization on domestic issues: 50%         
Serves as a distraction: 8%      
Don’t Know: 36%   
     
 
Note. For more information on this survey, visit 
http://www.machsong.org/english/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=59  
 
 The survey conducted at the Vietnam Freedom March focused on issues related to protest 
politics. This survey found a considerable gap between how the young would personally define 
“anti-communism” to mean today and their perception of how Vietnamese leaders in the U.S. 
would define “anti-communism.” Table 3 shows that 19 percent of respondents define “anti-
communism” as fighting communism, 38 percent as fighting for democracy and pluralism, and 
38 percent as encouraging Vietnam to improve its policy on human rights, democratic norms and 
practices. By contrast, 47 percent of respondents think that Vietnamese leaders define “anti-
communism” as fighting for communism, 29 percent as fighting democracy and pluralism, and 
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18 percent as encouraging Vietnam to improve its policy on human rights, democratic norms and 
practices. On the question of whether mobilization on homeland issues provides a foundation for 
subsequent political mobilization on domestic issues or whether it serves as a distraction from it, 
50 percent of respondents say that it provides mobilization on domestic issues, 8 percent say that 
it serves as a distraction, and 36 percent do not know. Table 3 also illustrates a great deal of trust 
and social obligation. No respondent marks that “most Vietnamese cannot be trusted” and all 
respondents agree that Vietnamese in America should work together for mutual assistance. 
 Meanwhile, the objective of the e-survey was to fulfill a gap in the study of public 
opinion of Vietnamese American students on a variety of issues. Table 4 shows that student 
respondents expressed considerable interests (top priority/very important) in encouraging 
Vietnam to improve its policy on human rights (61%) and fighting for democracy and pluralism 
(60%). The top concern was making money for themselves and their family (82%), followed by 
the desire of eliminating crimes in one’s neighborhood (76%) and making sure Vietnamese 
children retain their culture (66%). Table 4 also shows that respondents believed that 
involvement in the Vietnamese community was a priority. Confidence in leaders in the 
Vietnamese American community (50%) far exceeded the amount of the lack of confidence 
(32%), and the desire of cooperation between those leaders was relatively high; among various 
leaders and organizations, confidence in Vietnamese American elected leaders was the highest. 
Moreover, eighty percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that “People like me don't 
have any say about what the Vietnamese American Community does.”  
A substantive interpretation from the above descriptive results would be that if 
individuals from Vietnamese Student Associations and those who had participated in the 
Vietnam Freedom March are roughly reflective of young Vietnamese Americans who 
“consume” the social and political activities of the community, then some continuity of the anti-
communist sentiment or identity among the younger generations is quite possible. That is, both 
surveys’ respondents indicate that they would support a non-communist, democratic heritage, 
especially one that emphasizes human rights, democracy and pluralism for Vietnam. Another 
substantive interpretation would be that if individuals from Vietnamese Student Associations and 
those who had participated in the Vietnam Freedom March perceive differently regarding what is 
“anti-communism” relative to the current leaders of the community, then redefinition of anti-
communism is quite possible among younger Vietnamese Americans. That is, both surveys’ 
respondents indicate that they would support a non-communist identity, especially one that 
includes concerns for domestic issues and for more cooperation among community leaders. 
Descriptive results suggest or can’t rule out that if young Vietnamese Americans from the two 
surveys were to become community leaders and activists, they might be capable of organizing 
projects that reflect the concerns and needs of the growing and diverse members of the 
community on both domestic and homeland issues. And if these young Vietnamese Americans 
were to follow through on their beliefs regarding the need to work together for mutual assistance 
and to have cooperation among community leaders, they might be able to create a type of social 
capital that could bridge the noted “structural holes,” so as to maintain an “equilibrium state.” 
However, the above discussion of the results is not to establish the strength of correlation or 
causality. Rather, it is intended to inform future empirical research so that it can be more 
effective and efficient in answering how anti-communism can be organized for other purposes or 
reproduced to bridge internal divisions. 
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Table 4  





Please indicate how important the following issues are to 
you personally. 
 Top  Very  Somewhat Not Important Priority Important Important At All 
 
Making money for yourself or your family 
 
Eliminating crime in your neighborhood 
 
Making sure Vietnamese children retain 
their culture 
 
Encouraging Vietnam to improve its 
policy on human rights 
 
Fighting for democracy and pluralism 
  
37% 45% 5% 0% 
 
29% 47% 11% 0% 
 
32% 34% 24% 0% 
 
  
32% 29% 24% 0% 
 
 
42% 18% 26% 0% 
 Please indicate how much confidence you have for the 
following Vietnamese American organizations. 
 A great deal Quite a lot Not very  Not at all 
   Much 
 
Vietnamese religious organizations  
 
Vietnamese press  
 
Leaders in Vietnamese American 
Community 
 
Vietnamese American leaders in US 
Government and State/Local Government 
 
Vietnamese political groups or 
organizations 
 
21% 24% 26% 8% 
 
5% 21% 50% 10% 
 
21% 29% 24% 8% 
 
 
29% 34% 13% 8% 
 
 
24% 13% 39% 13% 
 Please indicate whether you agree or disagree to the 
following statements. 
   Agree Disagree 
 
“People like me don’t have any say about 
what the Vietnamese American 
community does.” 
 
“People like me don’t have any say about 
what the U.S. Government does.” 
  




  18% 78% 
 
Note. For more information on this survey, visit 
http://news.ncmonline.com/news/view_article.html?article_id=3d6af203641f552ae5dc9437176a19c0  
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Conclusion 
 
After the wake of Hurricane Katrina, there has been a keen interest by the mainstream media to 
report on Vietnamese Katrina evacuees, who were initially and disproportionately among the 
first to return and to have rebuilt their community in East New Orleans. In fact, by the second 
anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, more than a majority of the residents and businesses had come 
back. However, many of the media reports tended to view the recovery by the Vietnamese 
Versailles Community through the Asian American model-minority myth. Vietnamese refugees 
and immigrants have come to rely on their culture of self-reliance (as associated with Asian 
Americans in general) to overcome Katrina. However, many members of the Vietnamese 
Versailles Community drew parallels to their migration displacements associated with the 
Vietnam War in reacting and responding to Hurricane Katrina. Consequently, they “put to use” 
and “drew on” the tales of overcoming “forced” migrations and catastrophic loss that their ethnic 
group experienced in 1954 when the country was split into “two countries,” and again in 1975, 
when the country was “reunified” under the communist regime (Leong, Airriess, Li, Chen, & 
Keith, 2007). 
This could be seen through the Mary Queen of Vietnam Catholic Church, whose 
leadership not only spearheaded the rebuilding but was also transformed in post-Katrina. In the 
initial months after Katrina, a city’s rebuilding commission had recommended that a moratorium 
on construction in the heavily damaged neighborhoods be in place. In response, the church’s 
leadership decided to challenge the commission. It began to re-knit the community without 
permission. This strategy is paying off, demonstrating to the city that Vietnamese have intent to 
return. As a result, a city urban planning team is now working with community leaders, looking 
beyond the rebuilding phase, such as a future plan for a community center, a retirement home, 
and the area’s history and culture museum. The Vietnamese community has also shown the 
ability to build and lead community coalitions—including African Americans, environmental 
groups, and younger Vietnamese Americans—in getting the city to close a landfill that had 
opened near Village de l’Est after Katrina. Moreover, such community organizing created an 
opportunity for one particular leader, Joseph Anh Cao Nguyen, to successfully run as and 
become the first Vietnamese American U.S. Congressman. Not surprisingly, Congressman 
Nguyen’s policy towards Vietnam echoes the community’s persistent stance that the current 
Vietnamese regime needs to respect human rights, religious freedom, and political pluralism.  
The above would seem to underscore the need to account for the fact that anti-
communism can still be a unifying force and whose identity can still be reproduced by 
individuals or sub-groups acting in context in addressing the need of Vietnamese Americans. 
Indeed, as noted earlier, a trait unique to Vietnamese Americans is their high levels of ethnic 
solidarity. On the one hand, this solidarity facilitates the ability of Vietnamese Americans to 
organize protests and demonstrations easily and effectively in stating policy preference, 
especially on homeland issues. On the other hand, the same mechanisms that allow for strong 
group solidarity can result in volatile internal divisions and differences. Therefore, a key 
question is whether ethnic solidarity and mobilization on homeland issues provides a foundation 
for bridging the community’s “structural holes” and for subsequent political mobilization on 
domestic issues, respectively. It appears that the answer to the above depends on who is 
organizing or transcending the anti-communist ideology and for what purpose. In this article, 
there has been an attempt to explore a framework that can analyze anti-communism as a divisive 
factor and a unifying factor, as well as a social movement in which persistent and change are 
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parcel to anti-communism. By doing so, analyses on Vietnamese American anti-communism can 
be better understood, including how or who they include or exclude and whether they produce a 
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